Gunner's Military News Gathering Blog

This blog is dedicated to supporting our troops and their families.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

Two Blue Star Tribute Videos

Here are two videos produced by Reinhart Media. Click on the Triangle in the middle of the images to start the videos. Many thanks to Tim Reinhart.


"The Blue Star Banner"(4:08)




"Blue Star Families" (1:25)

Labels: Blue Star, Blue Star Banner, Blue Star Families, Reinhart Media, Tim Reinhart, video

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 6:20 PM

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/30/07

"Aid Station's Doors Open to Iraqi Children"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12059

"Soldiers Remember Iraqi Man's Sacrifice That Saved T..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12060

"Ft. Gillem Based Unit Comes Home"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12056

"Soldiers, Iraqi Contractors Making Plans for Furat"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12065

"New Medical Clinic Serves Sangin Residents"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12067

"3rd BCT Infantryman Inspires During Recovery"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12074

"New Clothes, New Beginning: Iraqi Air Force on Taji ..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12076

"Agricultural Unions Get Lesson in Business Strategies"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12077

"3rd BCT Holds 'Country's Barbecue Fun Run' "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12078

Labels: 3rd BCT, Aid Station, BBQ Fun Run, Business Strategies, Ft. Gillem, Furat, Iraqi Children, Iraqi Contractors, New Beginning, New Clothes, Sagin Residents, Soldiers Remember, Tropic at Taji

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 5:51 PM

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

A failure in generalship

Armed Forces Journal
May 2007
By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling

"You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict."
- Frederick the Great

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.


These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.


The Responsibilities of Generalship

Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate with the stakes of the conflict.

Popular passions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, but cannot be sufficient. To prevail, generals must provide policymakers and the public with a correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.

However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities.

The correct estimation of strategic possibilities can be further subdivided into the preparation for war and the conduct of war. Preparation for war consists in the raising, arming, equipping and training of forces. The conduct of war consists of both planning for the use of those forces and directing those forces in operations.

To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate those conditions in peacetime exercises. Of course, not even the most skilled general can visualize precisely how future wars will be fought. According to British military historian and soldier Sir Michael Howard, "In structuring and preparing an army for war, you can be clear that you will not get it precisely right, but the important thing is not to be too far wrong, so that you can put it right quickly."

The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I, French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics. The German Army did not get this new form of warfare precisely right. After the 1939 conquest of Poland, the German Army undertook a critical self-examination of its operations. However, German generals did not get it too far wrong either, and in less than a year had adapted their tactics for the invasion of France.

After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades. If the general waits until the public and its elected representatives are immediately concerned with national security threats before finding his voice, he has waited too long. The general who speaks too loudly of preparing for war while the nation is at peace places at risk his position and status. However, the general who speaks too softly places at risk the security of his country.

Failing to visualize future battlefields represents a lapse in professional competence, but seeing those fields clearly and saying nothing is an even more serious lapse in professional character. Moral courage is often inversely proportional to popularity and this observation in nowhere more true than in the profession of arms. The history of military innovation is littered with the truncated careers of reformers who saw gathering threats clearly and advocated change boldly. A military professional must possess both the physical courage to face the hazards of battle and the moral courage to withstand the barbs of public scorn. On and off the battlefield, courage is the first characteristic of generalship.


Failures of Generalship in Vietnam

America's defeat in Vietnam is the most egregious failure in the history of American arms. America's general officer corps refused to prepare the Army to fight unconventional wars, despite ample indications that such preparations were in order. Having failed to prepare for such wars, America's generals sent our forces into battle without a coherent plan for victory. Unprepared for war and lacking a coherent strategy, America lost the war and the lives of more than 58,000 service members.

Following World War II, there were ample indicators that America's enemies would turn to insurgency to negate our advantages in firepower and mobility. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria offered object lessons to Western armies facing unconventional foes. These lessons were not lost on the more astute members of America's political class. In 1961, President Kennedy warned of "another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him." In response to these threats, Kennedy undertook a comprehensive program to prepare America's armed forces for counterinsurgency.

Despite the experience of their allies and the urging of their president, America's generals failed to prepare their forces for counterinsurgency. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Decker assured his young president, "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." Despite Kennedy's guidance to the contrary, the Army viewed the conflict in Vietnam in conventional terms. As late as 1964, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated flatly that "the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military." While the Army made minor organizational adjustments at the urging of the president, the generals clung to what Andrew Krepinevich has called "the Army concept," a vision of warfare focused on the destruction of the enemy's forces.

Having failed to visualize accurately the conditions of combat in Vietnam, America's generals prosecuted the war in conventional terms. The U.S. military embarked on a graduated attrition strategy intended to compel North Vietnam to accept a negotiated peace. The U.S. undertook modest efforts at innovation in Vietnam. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), spearheaded by the State Department's "Blowtorch" Bob Kromer, was a serious effort to address the political and economic causes of the insurgency. The Marine Corps' Combined Action Program (CAP) was an innovative approach to population security. However, these efforts are best described as too little, too late. Innovations such as CORDS and CAP never received the resources necessary to make a large-scale difference. The U.S. military grudgingly accepted these innovations late in the war, after the American public's commitment to the conflict began to wane.

America's generals not only failed to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam, but also remained largely silent while the strategy developed by civilian politicians led to defeat. As H.R. McMaster noted in "Dereliction of Duty," the Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided by service parochialism and failed to develop a unified and coherent recommendation to the president for prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson estimated in 1965 that victory would require as many as 700,000 troops for up to five years. Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene made a similar estimate on troop levels. As President Johnson incrementally escalated the war, neither man made his views known to the president or Congress. President Johnson made a concerted effort to conceal the costs and consequences of Vietnam from the public, but such duplicity required the passive consent of America's generals.

Having participated in the deception of the American people during the war, the Army chose after the war to deceive itself. In "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife," John Nagl argued that instead of learning from defeat, the Army after Vietnam focused its energies on the kind of wars it knew how to win — high-technology conventional wars. An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War," by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency.

By the early 1990s, the Army's focus on conventional war-fighting appeared to have been vindicated. During the 1980s, the U.S. military benefited from the largest peacetime military buildup in the nation's history. High-technology equipment dramatically increased the mobility and lethality of our ground forces. The Army's National Training Center honed the Army's conventional war-fighting skills to a razor's edge. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the demise of the Soviet Union and the futility of direct confrontation with the U.S. Despite the fact the U.S. supported insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to hasten the Soviet Union's demise, the U.S. military gave little thought to counterinsurgency throughout the 1990s. America's generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past — state-on-state conflicts against conventional forces. America's swift defeat of the Iraqi Army, the world's fourth-largest, in 1991 seemed to confirm the wisdom of the U.S. military's post-Vietnam reforms. But the military learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm. It continued to prepare for the last war, while its future enemies prepared for a new kind of war.


Failures of Generalship in Iraq

America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America's generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America's generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq.

Despite paying lip service to "transformation" throughout the 1990s, America's armed forces failed to change in significant ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In "The Sling and the Stone," T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department's transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America's generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise "Desert Crossing" demonstrated that many postwar stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.

After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America's generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America's generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.

After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that "there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." The ISG noted that "on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals." Population security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than three years, America's generals continued to insist that the U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians, each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America's general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America's generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation's deployable land power to a single theater of operations.

The intellectual and moral failures common to America's general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations failed to perform its intended functions. To understand how the U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgent enemy for the second time in a generation, we must look at the structural influences that produce our general officer corps.


The Generals We Need

The most insightful examination of failed generalship comes from J.F.C. Fuller's "Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure." Fuller was a British major general who saw action in the first attempts at armored warfare in World War I. He found three common characteristics in great generals — courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness.

The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general officers is self-evident. An understanding of the larger aspects of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey of Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25 percent hold advanced degrees from civilian institutions in the social sciences or humanities. Counterinsurgency theory holds that proficiency in foreign languages is essential to success, yet only one in four of the Army's senior generals speaks another language. While the physical courage of America's generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters. Now that the public is immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.

Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America's general officer corps. Indeed, the tendency of the executive branch to seek out mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals is part of the problem. The services themselves are equally to blame. The system that produces our generals does little to reward creativity and moral courage. Officers rise to flag rank by following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals, both active and retired, are the most important figures in determining an officer's potential for flag rank. The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer's advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties.

If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America's military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.

To improve the creative intelligence of our generals, Congress must change the officer promotion system in ways that reward adaptation and intellectual achievement. Congress should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly. They are also less wed to organizational norms and less influenced by organizational taboos. Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.

Congress should also modify the officer promotion system in ways that reward intellectual achievement. The Senate should examine the education and professional writing of nominees for three- and four-star billets as part of the confirmation process. The Senate would never confirm to the Supreme Court a nominee who had neither been to law school nor written legal opinions. However, it routinely confirms four-star generals who possess neither graduate education in the social sciences or humanities nor the capability to speak a foreign language. Senior general officers must have a vision of what future conflicts will look like and what capabilities the U.S. requires to prevail in those conflicts. They must possess the capability to understand and interact with foreign cultures. A solid record of intellectual achievement and fluency in foreign languages are effective indicators of an officer's potential for senior leadership.

To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility. Some of the answers will be shocking, which is perhaps why Congress has not asked and the generals have not told. Congress must ask for a candid assessment of the money and manpower required over the next generation to prevail in the Long War. The money required to prevail may place fiscal constraints on popular domestic priorities. The quantity and quality of manpower required may call into question the viability of the all-volunteer military. Congress must re-examine the allocation of existing resources, and demand that procurement priorities reflect the most likely threats we will face. Congress must be equally rigorous in ensuring that the ways of war contribute to conflict termination consistent with the aims of national policy. If our operations produce more enemies than they defeat, no amount of force is sufficient to prevail. Current oversight efforts have proved inadequate, allowing the executive branch, the services and lobbyists to present information that is sometimes incomplete, inaccurate or self-serving. Exercising adequate oversight will require members of Congress to develop the expertise necessary to ask the right questions and display the courage to follow the truth wherever it leads them.

Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. In the past this requirement has been pro forma in all but a few cases. A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.


Mortal Danger

This article began with Frederick the Great's admonition to his officers to focus their energies on the larger aspects of war. The Prussian monarch's innovations had made his army the terror of Europe, but he knew that his adversaries were learning and adapting. Frederick feared that his generals would master his system of war without thinking deeply about the ever-changing nature of war, and in doing so would place Prussia's security at risk. These fears would prove prophetic. At the Battle of Valmy in 1792, Frederick's successors were checked by France's ragtag citizen army. In the fourteen years that followed, Prussia's generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like those of the past. In 1806, the Prussian Army marched lockstep into defeat and disaster at the hands of Napoleon at Jena. Frederick's prophecy had come to pass; Prussia became a French vassal.

Iraq is America's Valmy. America's generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
On Monday, August 27, I posted an article from the NY Times entitled "Challenging the Generals", see: http://www.usafns.com/2007/08/challenging-generals.htm. That article was based primarily on Lt. Col. Yingling's "A failure in Generalship". I have had several discussions with friends regarding both of these postings. The problem is fairly clearly defined in these two articles, but the answer is not so easy. The great length both articles attest to the fact that this is complex and difficult. I must admit that I don't know all the answers, but I do know a hell of a lot of questions.

I must admit that I tend to over simplify matters, but as I see it, a pretty good analogy to the "game" of generalship is the game of musical chairs. When things are going smoothly, the generals spend their time engaging in "mutual admiration activities" wherein circular reporting convinces them that they are doing a great job. Score is kept by the size of the appropriations that congress doles out to their projects.

Then, when a shooting war starts, and the stuff hits the fan, everyone looks for a "seat", and the general left standing is holding the bag - takes the hit, and retires into oblivion; becomes a corporate board member or becomes a talking head on one of the networks. But, not a single one is ever reprimanded, court martialed, demoted or otherwise disciplined because they cannot win a battle or a war. As the NY Times article said, a private pays a heavier penalty for being 15 minutes late to a company formation.

~g

Labels: Frederic the Great, Generalship, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, Vietnam

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:24 PM

Tuesday, August 28, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/28/07

"Crews Keep Aircraft Aloft"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12010

"66th MPs Celebrate Unity With Afghans"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12012

"1-10 Field Artillery Brings a Different Fight "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12013

"Gecko Paves Way for Change"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12018

"Letter of the Law Can Be Found in Parwan"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12019

"Local Sab Al Bor Government Holds First Public Works..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12022

"New Library Opens Its Doors for Business in Northern..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12025

"Outsiders Deliver Food, Water, After Devastating Blasts"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12028

"Comedy Corps Serves Up Laughter for Camp Lemonier Se..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12030

"District Council Subcommittee Focuses on Human Right..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12036

"Apache Troop Keeps the Peace, Spreads Some Happiness"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12038

"Cooking in Combat "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12040

"Central Baghdad School Opens After Two Months of Ren..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12041

"Commanding General Praises 'Spearhead Battalion' "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12043

"3rd BCT Celebrates Women's Equality With 5K Run"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12045

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:27 PM

Monday, August 27, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/27/07

"3-1 Cavalry Denies Enemy Sanctuary in Jisr Diyala"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11985

"3rd HBCT Honors Family of Fallen Hero"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11986

"American Cops Teach Iraqi Police to 'serve and Protect'"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11991

"Iraqi Doctors, Medics Treat Fellow Iraqis at Medical..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12004

"Medical Aid Delivered to East Baghdad Clinics"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=12006

Labels: 3-1 Cav., 3rd HBCT, American Cops, Baghdad Clinics, Iraqi Doctors, Iraqi Medics, Iraqi Police, Medical Aid

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 5:39 PM

Challenging the Generals

Challenging the Generals

New York Times
By FRED KAPLAN
Published: August 26, 2007

On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army's vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army's elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army's second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled "A Failure in Generalship." The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army's generals of lacking "professional character," "creative intelligence and "moral courage."

Yingling's article — published in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal — noted that a key role of generals is to advise policy makers and the public on the means necessary to win wars. "If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means," he wrote, "he shares culpability for the results." Today's generals "failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly," and they failed to advise policy makers on how much force would be necessary to win and stabilize Iraq. These failures, he insisted, stemmed not just from the civilian leaders but also from a military culture that "does little to reward creativity and moral courage." He concluded, "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

General Cody "looked around the auditorium, packed with men and women in uniform — most of them in their mid-20s, three decades his junior but far more war-hardened than he or his peers were at the same age — and turned Captain Wignall's question around. "You all have just come from combat, you're young captains," he said, addressing the entire room. "What's your opinion of the general officers corps?"

Over the next 90 minutes, five captains stood up, recited their names and their units and raised several of Yingling's criticisms. One asked why the top generals failed to give political leaders full and frank advice on how many troops would be needed in Iraq. One asked whether any generals "should be held accountable" for the war's failures. One asked if the Army should change the way it selected generals. Another said that general officers were so far removed from the fighting, they wound up "sheltered from the truth" and "don't know what's going on."

Challenges like this are rare in the military, which depends on obedience and hierarchy. Yet the scene at Fort Knox reflected a brewing conflict between the Army's junior and senior officer corps — lieutenants and captains on one hand, generals on the other, with majors and colonels ("field-grade officers") straddling the divide and sometimes taking sides. The cause of this tension is the war in Iraq, but the consequences are broader. They revolve around the obligations of an officer, the nature of future warfare and the future of the Army itself. And these tensions are rising at a time when the war has stretched the Army's resources to the limit, when junior officers are quitting at alarming rates and when political leaders are divided or uncertain about America's — and its military's — role in the world.

Colonel Yingling's article gave these tensions voice; it spelled out the issues and the stakes; and it located their roots in the Army's own institutional culture, specifically in the growing disconnect between this culture — which is embodied by the generals — and the complex realities that junior officers, those fighting the war, are confronting daily on the ground. The article was all the more potent because it was written by an active-duty officer still on the rise. It was a career risk, just as, on a smaller scale, standing up and asking the Army vice chief of staff about the article was a risk.

In response to the captains' questions, General Cody acknowledged, as senior officers often do now, that the Iraq war was "mismanaged" in its first phases. The original plan, he said, did not anticipate the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, the disruption of oil production or the rise of an insurgency. Still, he rejected the broader critique. "I think we've got great general officers that are meeting tough demands," he insisted. He railed instead at politicians for cutting back the military in the 1990s. "Those are the people who ought to be held accountable," he said.

Before and just after America's entry into World War II, Gen. George Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, purged 31 of his 42 division and corps commanders, all of them generals, and 162 colonels on the grounds that they were unsuited for battle. Over the course of the war, he rid the Army of 500 colonels. He reached deep into the lower ranks to find talented men to replace them. For example, Gen. James Gavin, the highly decorated commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, was a mere major in December 1941 when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Today, President Bush maintains that the nation is in a war against terrorism — what Pentagon officials call "the long war" — in which civilization itself is at stake. Yet six years into this war, the armed forces — not just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines — have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate.

On the lower end of the scale, things have changed — but for the worse. West Point cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them decide not to sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced that decision, only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11 were still vivid; the war in Afghanistan seemed a success; and war in Iraq was under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. But last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the service's highest loss rate in three decades.

Col. Don Snider, a longtime professor at West Point, sees a "trust gap" between junior and senior officers. There has always been a gap, to some degree. What's different now is that many of the juniors have more combat experience than the seniors. They have come to trust their own instincts more than they trust orders. They look at the hand they've been dealt by their superiors' decisions, and they feel let down.

The gap is widening further, Snider told me, because of this war's operating tempo, the "unrelenting pace" at which soldiers are rotated into Iraq for longer tours — and a greater number of tours — than they signed up for. Many soldiers, even those who support the war, are wearying of the endless cycle. The cycle is a result of two decisions. The first occurred at the start of the war, when the senior officers assented to the decision by Donald Rumsfeld, then the secretary of defense, to send in far fewer troops than they had recommended. The second took place two years later, well into the insurgency phase of the war, when top officers declared they didn't need more troops, though most of them knew that in fact they did. "Many junior officers," Snider said, "see this op tempo as stemming from the failure of senior officers to speak out."

Paul Yingling did not set out to cause a stir. He grew up in a working-class part of Pittsburgh. His father owned a bar; no one in his family went to college. He joined the Army in 1984 at age 17, because he was a troubled kid — poor grades and too much drinking and brawling — who wanted to turn his life around, and he did. He went to Duquesne University, a small Catholic school, on an R.O.T.C. scholarship; went on active duty; rose through the ranks; and, by the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, was a lieutenant commanding an artillery battery, directing cannon fire against Saddam Hussein's army.

"When I was in the gulf war, I remember thinking, This is easier than it was at training exercises," he told me earlier this month. He was sent to Bosnia in December 1995 as part of the first peacekeeping operation after the signing of the Dayton accords, which ended the war in Bosnia. "This was nothing like training," he recalled. Like most of his fellow soldiers, he was trained almost entirely for conventional combat operations: straightforward clashes, brigades against brigades. (Even now, about 70 percent of the training at the Captains Career Course is for conventional warfare.) In Bosnia, there was no clear enemy, no front line and no set definition of victory. "I kept wondering why things weren't as well rehearsed as they'd been in the gulf war," he said.

Upon returning, he spent the next six years pondering that question. He studied international relations at the University of Chicago's graduate school and wrote a master's thesis about the circumstances under which outside powers can successfully intervene in civil wars. (One conclusion: There aren't many.) He then taught at West Point, where he also read deeply in Western political theory. Yingling was deployed to Iraq in July 2003 as an executive officer collecting loose munitions and training Iraq's civil-defense corps. "The corps deserted or joined the insurgency on first contact," he recalled. "It was a disaster."

In the late fall of 2003, his first tour of duty over, Yingling was sent to Fort Sill, Okla., the Army's main base for artillery soldiers, and wrote long memos to the local generals, suggesting new approaches to the war in Iraq. One suggestion was that since artillery rockets were then playing little role, artillery soldiers should become more skilled in training Iraqi soldiers; that, he thought, would be vital to Iraq's future stability. No one responded to his memos, he says. He volunteered for another tour of combat and became deputy commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was fighting jihadist insurgents in the northern Iraqi town of Tal Afar.

The commander of the third regiment, Col. H. R. McMaster, was a historian as well as a decorated soldier. He figured that Iraq could not build its own institutions, political or military, until its people felt safe. So he devised his own plan, in which he and his troops cleared the town of insurgents — and at the same time formed alliances and built trust with local sheiks and tribal leaders. The campaign worked for a while, but only because McMaster flooded the city with soldiers — about 1,000 of them per square kilometer. Earlier, as Yingling drove around to other towns and villages, he saw that most Iraqis were submitting to whatever gang or militia offered them protection, because United States and coalition forces weren't anywhere around. And that was because the coalition had entered the war without enough troops. Yingling was seeing the consequences of this decision up close in the terrible insecurity of most Iraqis' lives.

In February 2006, Yingling returned to Fort Sill. That April, six retired Army and Marine generals publicly criticized Rumsfeld, who was still the secretary of defense, for sending too few troops to Iraq. Many junior and field-grade officers reacted with puzzlement or disgust. Their common question: Where were these generals when they still wore the uniform? Why didn't they speak up when their words might have counted? One general who had spoken up, Eric Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, was publicly upbraided and ostracized by Rumsfeld; other active-duty generals got the message and stayed mum.

That December, Yingling attended a Purple Heart ceremony for soldiers wounded in Iraq. "I was watching these soldiers wheeling into this room, or in some cases having to be wheeled in by their wives or mothers," he recalled. "And I said to myself: 'These soldiers were doing their jobs. The senior officers were not doing theirs. We're not giving our soldiers the tools and training to succeed.' I had to go public."

Soon after Yingling's article appeared, Maj. Gen. Jeff Hammond, commander of the Fourth Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Tex., reportedly called a meeting of the roughly 200 captains on his base, all of whom had served in Iraq, for the purpose of putting this brazen lieutenant colonel in his place. According to The Wall Street Journal, he told his captains that Army generals are "dedicated, selfless servants." Yingling had no business judging generals because he has "never worn the shoes of a general." By implication, Hammond was warning his captains that they had no business judging generals, either. Yingling was stationed at Fort Hood at the time, preparing to take command of an artillery battalion. From the steps of his building, he could see the steps of General Hammond's building. He said he sent the general a copy of his article before publication as a courtesy, and he never heard back; nor was he notified of the general's meeting with his captains.

The "trust gap" between junior and senior officers is hardly universal. Many junior officers at Fort Knox and elsewhere have no complaints about the generals — or regard the matter as way above their pay grade. As Capt. Ryan Kranc, who has served two tours in Iraq, one as a commander, explained to me, "I'm more interested in whether my guys can secure a convoy." He dismissed complaints about troop shortages. "When you're in a system, you're never going to get everything you ask for," he said, "but I still have to accomplish a mission. That's my job. If they give me a toothpick, dental floss and a good hunting knife, I will accomplish the mission."

An hour after General Cody's talk at Fort Knox, several captains met to discuss the issue over beers. Capt. Garrett Cathcart, who has served in Iraq as a platoon leader, said: "The culture of the Army is to accomplish the mission, no matter what. That's a good thing." Matt Wignall, who was the first captain to ask General Cody about the Yingling article, agreed that a mission-oriented culture was "a good thing, but it can be dangerous." He added: "It is so rare to hear someone in the Army say, 'No, I can't do that.' But sometimes it takes courage to say, 'I don't have the capability.' " Before the Iraq war, when Rumsfeld overrode the initial plans of the senior officers, "somebody should have put his foot down," Wignall said.

Lt. Col. Allen Gill, who just retired as director of the R.O.T.C. program at Georgetown University, has heard versions of this discussion among his cadets for years. He raises a different concern about the Army's "can do" culture. "You're not brought up in the Army to tell people how you can't get things done, and that's fine, that's necessary," he said. "But when you get promoted to a higher level of strategic leadership, you have to have a different outlook. You're supposed to make clear, cold calculations of risk — of the probabilities of victory and defeat."

The problem, he said, is that it's hard for officers — hard for people in any profession — to switch their basic approach to life so abruptly. As Yingling put it in his article, "It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late 40s."

Yingling's commander at Tal Afar, H. R. McMaster, documented a similar crisis in the case of the Vietnam War. Twenty years after the war, McMaster wrote a doctoral dissertation that he turned into a book called "Dereliction of Duty." It concluded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960s betrayed their professional obligations by failing to provide unvarnished military advice to President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as they plunged into the Southeast Asian quagmire. When McMaster's book was published in 1997, Gen. Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ordered all commanders to read it — and to express disagreements to their superiors, even at personal risk. Since then, "Dereliction of Duty" has been recommended reading for Army officers.

Yet before the start of the Iraq war and during the early stages of the fighting, the Joint Chiefs once again fell silent. Justin Rosenbaum, the captain at Fort Knox who asked General Cody whether any generals would be held accountable for the failures in Iraq, said he was disturbed by this parallel between the two wars. "We've read the McMaster book," he said. "It's startling that we're repeating the same mistakes."

McMaster's own fate has reinforced these apprehensions. President Bush has singled out McMaster's campaign at Tal Afar as a model of successful strategy. Gen. David Petraeus, now commander of United States forces in Iraq, frequently consults with McMaster in planning his broader counterinsurgency campaign. Yet the Army's promotion board — the panel of generals that selects which few dozen colonels advance to the rank of brigadier general — has passed over McMaster two years in a row.

McMaster's nonpromotion has not been widely reported, yet every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered its implications. One colonel, who asked not to be identified because he didn't want to risk his own ambitions, said: "Everyone studies the brigadier-general promotion list like tarot cards — who makes it, who doesn't. It communicates what qualities are valued and not valued." A retired Army two-star general, who requested anonymity because he didn't want to anger his friends on the promotion boards, agreed. "When you turn down a guy like McMaster," he told me, "that sends a potent message to everybody down the chain. I don't know, maybe there were good reasons not to promote him. But the message everybody gets is: 'We're not interested in rewarding people like him. We're not interested in rewarding agents of change.' "

Members of the board, he said, want to promote officers whose careers look like their own. Today's generals rose through the officer corps of the peacetime Army. Many of them fought in the last years of Vietnam, and some fought in the gulf war. But to the extent they have combat experience, it has been mainly tactical, not strategic. They know how to secure an objective on a battlefield, how to coordinate firepower and maneuver. But they don't necessarily know how to deal with an enemy that's flexible, with a scenario that has not been rehearsed.

"Those rewarded are the can-do, go-to people," the retired two-star general told me. "Their skill is making the trains run on time. So why are we surprised that, when the enemy becomes adaptive, we get caught off guard? If you raise a group of plumbers, you shouldn't be upset if they can't do theoretical physics."

There are, of course, exceptions, most notably General Petraeus. He wrote an article for a recent issue of The American Interest, a Washington-based public-policy journal, urging officers to attend civilian graduate schools and get out of their "intellectual comfort zones" — useful for dealing with today's adaptive enemies.

Yet many Army officers I spoke with say Petraeus's view is rare among senior officers. Two colonels told me that when they were captains, their commanders strongly discouraged them from attending not just graduate school but even the Army's Command and General Staff College, warning that it would be a diversion from their career paths. "I got the impression that I'd be better off counting bedsheets in the Baghdad Embassy than studying at Harvard," one colonel said.

Harvard's merits aside, some junior officers agree that the promotion system discourages breadth. Capt. Kip Kowalski, an infantry officer in the Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, is a proud soldier in the can-do tradition. He is impatient with critiques of superiors; he prefers to stay focused on his job. "But I am worried," he said, "that generals these days are forced to be narrow." Kowalski would like to spend a few years in a different branch of the Army — say, as a foreign area officer — and then come back to combat operations. He says he thinks the switch would broaden his skills, give him new perspectives and make him a better officer. But the rules don't allow switching back and forth among specialties. "I have to decide right now whether I want to do ops or something else," he said. "If I go F. A. O., I can never come back."

In October 2006, seven months before his essay on the failure of generalship appeared, Yingling and Lt. Col. John Nagl, another innovative officer, wrote an article for Armed Forces Journal called "New Rules for New Enemies," in which they wrote: "The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion."

In late June, Yingling took command of an artillery battalion. This means he will most likely be promoted to full colonel. This assignment, however, was in the works nearly a year ago, long before he wrote his critique of the generals. His move and probable promotion say nothing about whether he'll be promoted further — or whether, as some of his admirers fear, his career will now grind to a halt.

Nagl — the author of an acclaimed book about counterinsurgency ("Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife"), a former operations officer in Iraq and the subject of a New York Times Magazine article a few years ago — has since taken command of a unit at Fort Riley, Kan., that trains United States soldiers to be advisers to Iraqi security forces. Pentagon officials have said that these advisers are crucial to America's future military policy. Yet Nagl has written that soldiers have been posted to this unit "on an ad hoc basis" and that few of the officers selected to train them have ever been advisers themselves.

Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson, a professor at West Point and former planning officer in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, said the fate of Nagl's unit — the degree to which it attracted capable, ambitious soldiers — depended on the answer to one question: "Will serving as an adviser be seen as equal to serving as a combat officer in the eyes of the promotion boards? The jury is still out."


"Guys like Yingling, Nagl and McMaster are the canaries in the coal mine of Army reform," the retired two-star general I spoke with told me. "Will they get promoted to general? If they do, that's a sign that real change is happening. If they don't, that's a sign that the traditional culture still rules."

Failure sometimes compels an institution to change its ways. The last time the Army undertook an overhaul was in the wake of the Vietnam War. At the center of those reforms was an officer named Huba Wass de Czege. Wass de Czege (pronounced VOSH de tsay-guh) graduated from West Point and served two tours of duty in Vietnam, the second as a company commander in the Central Highlands. He devised innovative tactics, leading four-man teams — at the time they were considered unconventionally small — on ambush raids at night. His immediate superiors weren't keen on his approach or attitude, despite his successes. But after the war ended and a few creative officers took over key posts, they recruited Wass de Czege to join them.

In 1982, he was ordered to rewrite the Army's field manual on combat operations. At his own initiative, he read the classics of military strategy — Clausewitz's "On War," Sun Tzu's "Art of War," B. H. Liddell Hart's "Strategy" — none of which had been on his reading list at West Point. And he incorporated many of their lessons along with his own experiences from Vietnam. Where the old edition assumed static clashes of firepower and attrition, Wass de Czege's revision emphasized speed, maneuver and taking the offensive. He was asked to create a one-year graduate program for the most promising young officers. Called the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, it brought strategic thinking back into the Army — at least for a while.

Now a retired one-star general, though an active Army consultant, Wass de Czege has publicly praised Yingling's article. (Yingling was a graduate of SAMS in 2002, well after its founder moved on.) In an essay for the July issue of Army magazine, Wass de Czege wrote that today's junior officers "feel they have much relevant experience [that] those senior to them lack," yet the senior officers "have not listened to them." These junior officers, he added, remind him of his own generation of captains, who held the same view during and just after Vietnam.

"The crux of the problem in our Army," Wass de Czege wrote, "is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems." Counterinsurgency wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are all about unstructured problems. The junior and field-grade officers, who command at the battalion level and below, deal with unstructured problems — adapting to the insurgents' ever-changing tactics — as a matter of course. Many generals don't, and never had to, deal with such problems, either in war or in their training drills. Many of them may not fully recognize just how distinct and difficult these problems are.

Speaking by phone from his home outside Fort Leavenworth, Wass de Czege emphasized that he was impressed with most of today's senior officers. Compared with those of his time, they are more capable, open and intelligent (most officers today, junior and senior, have college degrees, for instance). "You're not seeing any of the gross incompetence that was common in my day," he said. He added, however, that today's generals are still too slow to change. "The Army tends to be consensus-driven at the top," he said. "There's a good side to that. We're steady as a rock. You call us to arms, we'll be there. But when you roll a lot of changes at us, it takes awhile. The young guys have to drive us to it."

The day after his talk at Fort Knox, General Cody, back at his office in the Pentagon, reiterated his "faith in the leadership of the general officers." Asked about complaints that junior officers are forced to follow narrow paths to promotion, he said, "We're trying to do just the opposite." In the works are new incentives to retain officers, including not just higher bonuses but free graduate school and the right to choose which branch of the Army to serve in. "I don't want everybody to think there's one road map to colonel or general," he said. He denied that promotion boards picked candidates in their own image. This year, he said, he was on the board that picked new brigadier generals, and one of them, Jeffrey Buchanan, had never commanded a combat brigade; his last assignment was training Iraqi security forces. One colonel, interviewed later, said: "That's a good sign. They've never picked anybody like that before. But that's just one out of 38 brigadier generals they picked. It's still very much the exception."

There is a specter haunting the debate over Yingling's article — the specter of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. During World War II, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened to resign if the civilian commanders didn't order air support for the invasion of Normandy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill acceded. But during the Korean War, MacArthur — at the time, perhaps the most popular public figure in America — demanded that President Truman let him attack China. Truman fired him. History has redeemed both presidents' decisions. But in terms of the issues that Yingling, McMaster and others have raised, was there really a distinction? Weren't both generals speaking what they regarded as "truth to power"?

The very discussion of these issues discomforts many senior officers because they take very seriously the principle of civilian control. They believe it is not their place to challenge the president or his duly appointed secretary of defense, certainly not in public, especially not in wartime. The ethical codes are ambiguous on how firmly an officer can press an argument without crossing the line. So, many generals prefer to keep a substantial distance from that line — to keep the prospect of a constitutional crisis from even remotely arising.

On a blog Yingling maintains at the Web site of Small Wars Journal, an independent journal of military theory, he has acknowledged these dilemmas, but he hasn't disentangled them. For example, if generals do speak up, and the president ignores their advice, what should they do then — salute and follow orders, resign en masse or criticize the president publicly? At this level of discussion, the junior and midlevel officers feel uncomfortable, too.

Yingling's concern is more narrowly professional, but it should matter greatly to future policy makers who want to consult their military advisers. The challenge is how to ensure that generals possess the experience and analytical prowess to formulate sound military advice and the "moral courage," as Yingling put it, to take responsibility for that advice and for its resulting successes or failures. The worry is that too few generals today possess either set of qualities — and that the promotional system impedes the rise of officers who do.

As today's captains and majors come up through the ranks, the culture may change. One question is how long that will take. Another question is whether the most innovative of those junior officers will still be in the Army by the time the top brass decides reform is necessary. As Colonel Wilson, the West Point instructor, put it, "When that moment comes, will there be enough of the right folks in the right slots to make the necessary changes happen?"


Fred Kaplan is the national security columnist for Slate and author of the forthcoming book "Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Some things never change. I think that we covered this same territory during the later part of Vietnam war. The "stuff" that makes a good peace time warrior is NOT the same as that required to win a war. In combat, there is no second place - except for a national cemetery. In combat, savagery must replace gentlemanly conduct.

I am reminded of what I think is the real reason for the "Tail Hook" scandal of 1991 (see: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/navy/tailhook/). For decades, the US Navy had been teaching their fighter pilots that they were "tigers" in the air, and then expected them to be "pussy cats" on the ground. It should be fairly obviously to the most casual observer that this practice could and probably would develop schizoid personalities. For my money, that is exactly what happened, a few couldn't turn off the "tiger" side of their personality.

While Tailhook is usually filed under "political correctness" or lack thereof, I think that it clearly illustrates the point that our warriors can be pretty rough. I have never had the means to find out for sure, but I would bet that those who were reprimanded/drummed out of the Navy or Marine Corps were among our very best (most savage) fighter pilots.

~G

Labels: Captains Career Course, Col. Don Snider, Donald Rumsfeld, Ft. Knox, Gen. Richard Cody, Lt. Col Paul Yingling, Matt Wignall

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 4:57 PM

Friday, August 24, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/24/07

"Iraqi Engineers, Ironhorse Brigade, Meet to Build th..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11956

"Better Governance Mentorship Program Classes Continu..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11960

"International Armed Forces Engineers Work Together i..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11961

"Michigan Unit Keeps Convoys Safe, Secure"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11963

"Third Army Conducts Lucky Warrior Exercise"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11965

"Airpower Summary for August 17 "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11969

"Ivy Men Learn How to Take One Shot for One Kill"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11970

"MPs Help Recruit Future Iraqi Police"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11971

Labels: Air Power Summary, Engineers, Future Police, Iraqi Engineers, Ironhorse Brigade, Ivy Men, Lucky Warrior, Michigan Unit, MPs Recruit, One Shot for One Kill, Safe Secure Convoys, Third Army

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 6:43 PM

Thursday, August 23, 2007

MajGen. Mike Lehnert, USMC on Patriotism

This is a speech given by:

MajGen. Mike Lehnert, CG Marine Corps Installations West to the MAAC (Military Affairs Advisory Committee of the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce) on Friday 30 June.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen,

Eight days ago, I was present in the audience when Tom Brokaw addressed the 2006 Stanford graduating class. After the initial pleasantries and one-liners, Mr. Brokaw said something unexpected. He told the class that they were the children of privilege, fortunate to be attending one of the finest educational institutions in the country, the anointed because they had both the test scores for admittance and parents who were able to afford their tuition. He noted that they could likely expect rapid advancement in almost any endeavor they choose and that they were destined to lead the most powerful country in the world.

The class was beaming.

And then Brokaw reminded them that the liberties and freedoms they enjoyed were being defended by young people their age that did not have their advantages. That at this time thousands of men and women were fighting, dying and suffering debilitating injury to ensure that the rest of us could live the American dream.

There was an uncomfortable shifting in the seats, followed by slow but growing applause from the audience.

When we sent my son to Stanford four years ago, we filled out a form asking for demographic information. One of the questions for the parents said, what is your profession? After it was a list of about thirty professions including doctor, lawyer, congressman, educator, architect. Military was not listed so I filled in "other"

My son was the only graduate who had a parent serving in the armed forces. As I was introduced to his friends' parents, it was interesting to watch their reaction. Few had ever spoken to a member of the military. One asked me how my son was able to gain admittance with the disadvantage of having to attend "those DoD schools". Many voiced support for our military and told me that they'd have served but clearly military service was not for their kind of people.

This year of the so-called elite schools, Princeton led them with nine graduates electing military service. Compare that with 1956 when over 400 of the Princeton graduating class entered the military. Most of the other Ivy League schools had no one entering the military this year.

I wonder how many of you know the young people who are serving today. I won't embarrass anyone by asking for a show of hands to ask how many really know a young enlisted Marine who has been to war.

I'm going to try to give you a better feel about those who serve our nation.

Our Marines tend to come from working class families. For the most part, they came from homes where high school graduation was important but college was out of their reach. The homes they come from emphasize service. Patriotism isn't a word that makes them uncomfortable.

The global war on terrorism has been ongoing for nearly five years with Marines deployed in harms way for most of that time. It is a strange war because the sacrifices being levied upon our citizens are not evenly distributed throughout society. In fact, most Americans are only vaguely aware of what is going on.

That isn't the case aboard the Marine bases in Southern California where we see the sacrifice everyday as we train aboard those open spaces that you covet for other purposes. Many of our Marines are married and 70% of our married Marines live in your communities, not aboard Marine bases. These Marines coach your soccer teams. They attend your places of worship. They send their kids to your schools. However, in many ways they are as different from the rest of the citizens of Southern California as my son was different from the rest of the students at Stanford.

One of the huge differences between the rest of society and our Marine families, is when Marine daddies and mommies go to work, some of them never come home. The kids know that. The spouses know that. Week after week we get reports of another son, father, husband who won't be coming back. During the past four years, over 460 Marines from Southern California bases have been killed by the enemy. 107 more have died in Iraq and Afghanistan due to accidents. 6500 have been wounded some of them multiple times.

You will never know or meet Brandan Webb age 20 or Christopher White age 23 or Ben Williams age 30. They were all assigned to First Battalion First Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, California. They were some of the Marines who died this week out of Marine bases in Southern California.

Last Friday, we hosted a golf tournament at Camp Pendleton to raise money for wounded Marines. There are a lot of expenses that the government cannot legally pay for from appropriated funds. The people who attended the tournament genuinely wanted to help and we invited a couple of dozen wounded Marines to golf with them. As I watched the teams leave for a shotgun start, I saw three Marines sitting by themselves and went over to talk to them. Clearly they'd been told by their chain of command that this was their appointed place of duty. They were sitting in the sun chatting, probably not unhappy with the duty but mildly uncertain as to why they were there. I asked them why they weren't golfing and they said that they'd never learned. No one in their families ever played golf and that this was the first time they'd ever been on a golf course. I asked them how many times they'd deployed. One of the young men had just returned from his third deployment and had been wo unded every time. The others teased him for being a bullet magnet. I asked him if he was going to stay in and he thought for a moment what to say to a general and he said, "I think I'd like to try college. No one in my family has ever gone."

I asked these Marines if I could buy them a beer. They looked at me and smiled. One of them said, "We can't ask you to break the rules sir. None of us are 21 yet."

They seemed much older. As I left them I wondered about a policy that gives a young man the power of deciding who will live and who will die but won't let him drink a beer. I thought about these young Americans who had never shot golf but had shot and killed other men in order to carry out foreign policy.

On the 10th of August we will open a wounded warrior barracks at Camp Pendleton. Few taxpayers' dollars were used. We were able to raise the money through the Semper Fidelis fund to house those Marines who no longer need to be hospitalized but who suffer debilitating injuries and need follow-on care. Heretofore, when regiments left for the war, they left their non-deployables behind. These Marines often had to live in WWII era barracks with open squad bays and gang heads down the hallway. Those having limited mobility found it difficult and uncomfortable. It was no way to treat our wounded warriors. We're fixing it.

Now let me introduce you to another enlisted Marine. His name is Brendan Duffy. Brendan was an infantry Marine. Like so many others, Brendan had dreams of going to college but no means to do so. While he was in the Corps, he immediately began using his Montgomery GI bill benefits by enrolling in Mira Costa College. Though deployed soon after signing up for college, he took his textbooks to war. Last month he received Mira Costa's highest award for academic excellence, the Medal of Honor for Academic Excellence. Brendan described studying pre-calculus while fragments from explosions struck the sandbag shelter he was in.

Brendan left the Corps this week and has been accepted to the University of California Los Angeles to study math and economics.

Later this morning I'll be meeting with educators across the California University system. We are trying to make California more veteran friendly. California hosts 40% of the combat power of the Marine Corps and 40% of the Marine veterans who leave the Corps do so out of Southern California bases. 96% have participated in the Montgomery GI Bill and are eligible for benefits but only a small number enter the California University system. That's because California, unlike other states did not provide any veterans preference or even reach out to veterans. These combat veterans score in the top 50% of their age group, are drug free and morally straight but are lost to California and return to other states that aggressively work to attract them.

Several months ago, I along with senior leadership of all the Services, met with Governor Schwarzenegger and told him that California was not an education friendly state for military veterans. To his credit, he is trying to change that and this meeting today is a natural outgrowth of his support.

In Iraq, the media talks about the casualties. They seldom report the successes. I don't think that this is intentional. It is just more difficult to quantify progress and reduce it to a sound bite.

Some of you may recall almost exactly two years ago when a four man sniper team from 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was killed on a rooftop in Ramadi. It made news because sniper teams aren't supposed to get ambushed and because an M40A1 sniper rifle was now in the hands of the enemy.

Over the next two years, that rifle was used against Americans and we wanted it back. Last week, a 21 year old Marine sniper from 3rd Battalion, Fifth Marines out of Camp Pendleton observed a military aged male videotaping a passing patrol of amphibious assault vehicles near Camp Habbaniya. After radioing the patrol and telling them to stay low, the Marine watched the man aiming a sniper rifle that looked remarkably like his own.

He killed the enemy sniper with one round to the head. Seconds later, another insurgent entered on the passenger side and was surprised to see his partner dead. That hesitation was enough time to allow Sgt Kevin Homestead age 26 to kill the insurgent before he could drive off.

When the Marines went down to inspect the scene, they saw that the sniper rifle was one of their own. It was the same M-40A1 sniper rifle looted from the 2/4 sniper team exactly two years earlier.

We are making progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Army is more capable each month. In the Anbar province we have brought the 1st Iraqi Division - the most capable of the Iraqi formations - to the former British RAF base of Habbaniyah - between Fallujah and Ramadi. We are standing up the 7th Division. In Baghdad, Iraqi brigades own parts of the city and are reporting directly to the US Army Division commander as component units.

The Iraqi Police are the essential element - and the most difficult challenge. In any insurrection, the insurgent specifically targets the local security elements of the government - because they are essential to maintaining control via interaction with the community, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement against petty and organized crime, traffic control. These police units are having good success in places like Fallujah. Ramadi is a different kettle of fish. Some of the police departments haven't been paid in months and the intimidation campaign is in full force.

My Chief of Staff, Colonel Stu Navarre formerly the Commander of the 5th Marine Regiments told me this story. One day in December, the Ramadi Police Dept Operations Officer (#3 in the pecking order) did not come to work. When we inquired, he told us that the day before his 10 year old son had been kidnapped after school and transported to the north side of Ramadi. He was called by the kidnappers and advised of his son's location. When the Operations Officer arrived at the location, he found his son alive, with a note pinned to his shirt, "If you go to work tomorrow, you will never see your son again. We know where you live." I wonder how many of us would show up for work with that kind of intimidation.

Your fellow Americans in uniform in Iraq and Afghanistan are doing a superb job in the most dangerous places on earth. They believe in what they are doing. The majority of the sergeants, corporals, and privates enlisted after 9-11. They knew what they were signing up for. They want to deploy in defense of the nation. We are sending best leadership to the combat zone. Service in Iraq/Afghanistan has become the norm for our Marine and Army leaders, and an essential part of their experience/qualifications for advancement. Finally, the American people have continued to demonstrate an unprecedented level of support for their fellow Americans in uniform - as well as the understanding that these young men and women are executing the policies of their elected representatives.

Reconstructing an entire nation takes time. Think about our own experience during the American Revolution. Despite having a homogeneous nation with no incipient insurgency, it was thirteen years from the Revolution to the ratification of the Constitution. We seem to have forgotten that it takes time to build institutions.

Introduction of a stable, representative form of government in Iraq is revolutionary in its impacts on the region and the world. Iraq is at the center of the Mid-East, the Arab world, and Shia Islam. Iraq has been, and will continue to be a major producer of natural resources - especially oil. It is at the center of the chess board. Iraq separates two sponsors of terrorism - Iran and Syria - and with Afghanistan - isolates Iran. It is no coincidence that Muammar Qadaffi has sensed the change in the wind and sought to distance himself from terrorism and WMD and become a legitimate player in world politics.

The Iraqis are capable of running Iraq. Today, thousands of young Iraqis are lining up to become soldiers and policemen - despite constant, highly lethal attacks on recruiting stations, police stations, and army checkpoints. Concurrently, there is no more dangerous job than being a candidate for office or an elected official in Iraq. We should not underestimate the absolute danger to any Iraqi that steps up to plate for law, order, and progress. The enemy is absolutely committed to winning. For him, there is really no other option. He also understands that the center of gravity is the commitment of the American people.

One of my major concerns is quality of life issues for our Marines, Sailors and their families. We are making significant progress but we have a long way to go.

We are building 1600 more homes at Miramar to give our Marines and Sailors decent places to live. California is a beautiful State. It is also extraordinarily expensive and we are the gypsies in your castle often driving 50 or 60 miles one way to because those are the only places that our junior Marines can afford to live.

We are replacing worn out World War II vintage barracks that we make our single Marines live in. When I took over, I visited some of the open squad bay barracks at Camp Horno in Pendleton. A young Marine corporal and veteran of the fighting in Iraq looked at me and said, "Sir, I lived better in Fallujah." That hurt but he was right. A couple of weeks later I had a chance to talk to the Commandant and tell him the same story. I told him that at the rate we were replacing barracks, we wouldn't have decent enlisted quarters until 2036. To his credit, he listened and we now plan to have them replaced by 2013. This won't come without a cost because the Marine Corps doesn't get more money to build barracks, we have to realign our priorities and not buy other things that we need. It was a significant decision by our senior leadership but the right thing to do.

With our Navy partners we are going after Pay Day Lenders. Pay Day Lenders are the parasites found outside of our military bases in Southern California who pray on young Marines and Sailors because the lenders know they are uninformed consumers. Pay day lenders take advantage that California has some of the weakest laws in the country. In North Carolina, pay day lenders are limited to 36% annual percentage rates of interest. Here in San Diego we regularly see rates of 460% and I have seen rates as high as 920% being charged legally against our service members. Service members go into a cycle of debt. Ultimately because we expect our Marines to be financially responsible, their ability to reenlist, compete for good jobs and keep a security clearance is effected.

Let me be clear. Pay day lenders are not providing our Marines with a service. They are parasites, bottom feeders and scumbags. One of them sent me a note recently telling me that he was a member of an honorable profession and that I should back off. He told me that a pay day lending institution had been found in the ruins of Pompey after Mount Vesuvius erupted. I responded to him that archeologists also found a whore house and that antiquity did not bequeath virtue. It is a shameful practice.

We also recognize that military leaders have a responsibility to educate our service members and their families about sound money management. We are doing that. We are using our base papers, information campaigns and personal intervention to tell them that there are alternatives to the pay day lending institutions.

Both the State and Federal legislatures have heard our message as well and there are bills making their way through the process to significantly curtail the excesses of payday lenders.

I know that many of you came here today to find out what I would say about the airport situation at Miramar. So as not to disappoint you, let me be clear.

The Marines came to Miramar ten years ago as a result of a BRAC decision and four subsequent BRAC rounds determined that the interrelationship of the Marine and Navy bases in Southern California provided a capability that was unmatched anywhere in the country.

The Marine Corps uses its bases as a projection platform for combat power. 25,000 Marines from California bases are presently deployed in harms way and over 3,000 of them are from Miramar.

Through the years, we have accommodated our neighbors development needs. Often we allowed infrastructure that was unpopular elsewhere but vital to the community. San Diego's primary landfill is located at Miramar. A nuclear generation facility sits aboard Marine Corps property at Camp Pendleton and powers 2.2 million Southern California homes. We want to be good neighbors and work hard at it.

We examined the proposal for joint use of Miramar carefully, provided all data requested and saw that data ignored. Joint use does not work at Miramar. Thus the real issue is whether you want a civilian airport at Miramar or Marines.

If you want us to leave, you should say so. However you must understand that no matter what names are used to describe us in the Union Tribune, the decision whether or not to leave do not rest with the military leadership in Southern California. It rests with your elected leaders and most of them have clearly put defense needs above local requirements and said no to Miramar. The decision rests with the appointed civilian leadership in the department of defense. They've said no as well.

Sadly this controversy has effected local civil military relations. There is no way you can sugar coat it or pretend otherwise. But we are here. If our leadership tells us to leave we will. We will take our Marines, our families, our wounded and if necessary we will dig up our dead. However right now our leadership says we stay. And whether or not we remain in San Diego, the Marine Corps is committed to protecting your liberties and your freedoms.

We know that this is a difficult issue. We know that we have many friends in San Diego but we also know that we have others who see the economic potential of development of the military installations. They say that they love the military but would rather love them somewhere else than in their backyard.

If you take nothing away from this talk, I'd hope you understand and appreciate what a remarkable group of young people currently serve in your Armed Forces today. Want to know what Marine Generals talk about when we are together? We talk about what a remarkable privilege it is to lead these extraordinary Americans.

I started by mentioning Tom Brokaw. His book coined the phrase, The Greatest Generation" and our nation responded in kind. Twenty years from now we may recognize that this young generation currently serving has the same qualities of greatness.

On the battlefield today are future CEO's of corporations, university presidents, congressmen, state governors, Supreme Court justices and perhaps a future president of the United States.

Take the time to meet one of these young people. You won't be disappointed.

OK,

I've talked long enough. I'd be happy to take your questions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I got the above via email from a friend. I think that this the most direct, eloquent explanation and description of our young Marines and their patriotism. It is a little long for a blog, but it is worth the time to read,

~G

Labels: Camp Pendleton, MAAC, MajGen. Mike Lehnert USMC, Marines, Miramar, Patriotism, Tom Brokaw, Wound Warrior

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:58 PM

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/23/07

"'Grey Wolf' Soldiers Compete in Squat Competition"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11930

"Camp Lemonier Stages Crime Scene to Educate Service ..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11938

"Married Soldiers Fighting for Country and Family"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11940

"Ramadan Awareness Training Prepares Sailors for Isla..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11941

"Troop Command Commands Success During Deployment"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11949

"Army Reserve Unit Sets Standard for Transportation"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11950

"Adhamiyah Residents Join Local Guard Force to Improv..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11951

Labels: 1744 Transportation, Adhamiyah Residents, Army Reserve, Camp Lemonier, Grey Wolf, Local Guard Force, Married Soldiers, Ramadan Awareness, Squat Competition, Troop Command

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:45 PM

Wednesday, August 22, 2007

NY TImes - Nina Berman Photos (Slideshow)

The link below contains 11 photos of our soldiers, sailors and Marines wounded in Iraq. The one entitled "Marine Wedding" touched a nerve. Touched isn't strong enough - hammered is much more appropriate:

http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2007/08/21/arts/20070822_BERMAN_SLIDESHOW_index.html

Here is a link to the accompanying article:

Words Unspoken Are Rendered on War’s Faces

~G

Labels: Marine Wedding, Purple Heart

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 4:55 PM

Monday, August 20, 2007

IRAQ News Alerts by Google - 08/20/07

"SOUTHCOM Alerts Additional Medics for Peru Relief"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11879

"Medics Train Iraqi Government Employees on First Aid"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11883

"Iraqi Army, US Engineers Help Reconnect Taji to Majo..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11887

"1-15 Brings Mobile Communications to Battlefield"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11891

"1-15 Infantry Medics Hold Free Health Clinic"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11893

"CENTAF Commander Visits 379th Air Expeditionary Wing"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11900

"Soldiers and Sailors Supporting Ships "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11903

Labels: 1-15 Inf. Medics, 379th AEW, CENTAF, First Aid, Medics, Peru Relief, Soldiers and Sailors, SOUTHCOM, Supporting Ships

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:26 PM

Friday, August 17, 2007

Definition of a Veteran

"A veteran - whether active duty, retired, National Guard or Reserve - is someone who at one point in his life wrote a blank check made payable to the United States of America for an amount of 'up to and including my life.'

That is honor. There are far too many people in this country who don't understand it. -- "

Author Unknown

Labels: blank check, United States of America, Veteran Definition

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 9:19 PM

IRAQ News Alerts by Google - 08/17/07

Security improves in Iraq despite attacks: US general
Turkish Press - Plymouth,MI,USA
Security in Iraq is improving despite a wave of car bombings that include the worst single attack since the US-led invasion in 2003, the number-two leader ...
See all stories on this topic

Security improves in Iraq despite
France24 - Paris,France
by Fanny Carrier
Security in Iraq is improving despite a wave of car bombings that include the worst single attack since the US-led invasion in 2003, ...
See all stories on this topic

Who's Really Ready for Change?
Washington Post - United States
The question is, who best fits what the country wants. Clinton offers a clear break from the policies of the Bush administration and the assurance that she ...
See all stories on this topic

General: Quick Strikes Planned in Iraq
Forbes - NY,USA
Odierno acknowledged the devastation of this week's bomb attack in two northern Iraqi villages that officials say killed at least 500 people. ...
See all stories on this topic

Iraq awards mobile licences
Financial Times - London,England,UK
"To get the best return from the auction in such circumstances is a great vote of confidence in the Iraqi economy," he said. Orascom Telecom, the Egyptian ...
See all stories on this topic

Security improves in Iraq despite attacks
Khaleej Times - Dubai,United Arab Emirates
WASHINGTON - Security in Iraq is improving despite a wave of car bombings that include the worst single attack since the US-led invasion in 2003, ...
See all stories on this topic

Medical exodus worsens Iraq's ills
USA Today - USA
The exodus of qualified workers from Iraq is not limited to the medical profession. The Oxfam report said 40% of all Iraqi professionals, including teachers ...
See all stories on this topic

Labels: Biden, Medical Exodus, Mobile Licenses, Quick Strikes, Ready for Change, Security Improves

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:58 PM

Thursday, August 16, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/16/07

"Saying Goodbye to the Juice and Green Air"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11824

"Troops Relieve Baghdad Stress One Stage at a Time"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11829

"Airpower Summary for Aug. 12-15 "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11839

"Providers Furnish Basic Survival Needs to Forward So..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11841

"'Sick Call' Open: More Than 300 Iraqis Get Free Medi..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11842

Labels: Air Power Summary, Baghdad Stress, Green Air, Juice, Sick Call, Survival Needs

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:35 PM

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/14/07

"Smoking: a Sign of Progress in Iraq "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11800

"Soldiers, Environment Love WAG Bag"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11801

"Coalition Forces Train Iraqi Marines in Persian Gulf"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11806

"Baqubah Teacher Risks Life So Students Could Learn"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11814

Labels: Baqubah Teacher, Iraqi Marines, Sign of Progress, Smoking in Iraq, Students Learn, WAG Bag

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:05 PM

Monday, August 13, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/13/07

"Insurgents Killed in Failed Taliban Ambushes Near Sa..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11765

"Pavilion Brings Tropics to Troops at Taji"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11777

"Eagle Cash Saves Time, Money"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11781

"A Child's Eyes Never Lie"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11783

"Army Chief of Staff Conducts Re-enlistment, Visits 3..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11792

"AMC, 3-401st AFSB Contribute to Afghan First Program"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11795

Labels: 3-401st AFSB, Afghan First, Ambushes Fail, AMC, Chief of Staff, Child's Eyes, Insurgents Killed, Never Lie, Re-enlistment, Tropic at Taji

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:09 PM

Saturday, August 11, 2007

IRAQ News Alerts by Google - 08/11/07

Dad's in Iraq, and the Family's on Edge
New York Times - United States
"He's my best friend," she says. "We do everything together -- our kids are our world." She thinks of him when she sees Jay-Dee off by herself on the ...
See all stories on this topic

War money 'can be better spent on education and to bridge cultures'
Gulf News - Dubai,United Arab Emirates
Not only Americans can make Iraq better - neighbours like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, they need to help as well," Moshari said.
See all stories on this topic

AlterNet Readers' 10 Best Comments of the Week
AlterNet - San Francisco,CA,USA
Tbogg better watch his back. Reader newtype_alpha checked out last week's "Iraq Round-Up!" and pondered whether the US effort in Iraq isn't being hindered ...
See all stories on this topic

Shiite Militia Grows Bolder In Iraq
Guardian Unlimited - UK
He is the only Iraqi official with a free pass to go unchecked through security at the US military base in Kazimiyah. ``He is a rare breed in Iraq . ...
See all stories on this topic

Bush's Iraq troop surge garners surge in polls
Ha'aretz - Tel Aviv,Israel
The renewed willingness to reevaluate what is taking place in Iraq is best seen in an article published in the New York Times two weeks ago by two scholars ...
See all stories on this topic

Can't Possibly Get Any Better
CounterCurrents.org - India
Barone states that "People around the world may oppose American intervention in Iraq, but they also want many of the things we do. ...
See all stories on this topic

Labels: Alternet Readers, CounterCurrents.org, Education, Family on Edge, Guardian Unlimited, Gulf News, Ha'aretz, Shiite Militia, Troop Surge, War Money

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:19 PM

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/09 & 10/07

"No Child Left Behind: Civil Affairs Assistance Takes..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11706

"Toy Story -- Soldier on Mission for Goodwill for Ira..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11709

"From One Point to Another, Whatever It Takes to Acco..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11710

"Paratroopers Push Through the Pain"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11712

"Innovative Soldiers Revamp Lethal Iraqi War Jet"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11717

"Former White House PA Chosen as Flight Surgeon of th..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11719

"Afghan Children Return From Poland Field Trip "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11728

"Warrior Brigade Reaches Retention Goal"Can be viewed at... http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11736

Labels: Civil Affairs, Flight Surgeon, Iraqi War Jet, Mission for Goodwill, Paratroopers, Poland Field Trip, Warrior Brigade, Whatever It Takes

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 8:40 AM

Wednesday, August 08, 2007

IRAQ News Alerts by Google - 08/08/07

On Iraq, no better friend
Power Line - Minneapolis,MN,USA
The US, he insisted, should never pull out until we have real security in the form of an Iraqi military in control of the situation, something the British ...
See all stories on this topic

NYT's Baghdad Bureau Chief: 'No Doubt' Surge Making Life Better in ...
NewsBusters - USA
But Burns also thinks "there's no doubt" things are better in Iraq since the troop surge and that a withdrawal would make life "very much worse" there. ...
See all stories on this topic

Iraqi Leader Talks Security in Iran
Forbes - NY,USA
The Iraqi prime minister's visit to Tehran came two days after US and Iranian experts held talks in Baghdad on improving Iraq's security. ...
See all stories on this topic

Would It Take A Dictator to Stabilize Iraq?
IraqSlogger - USA
The re-emergence of a nationalist dictator could provide Iraq its best hope for stability, according to a number of scenarios proposed by a workshop held by ...
See all stories on this topic

Helping enemies in Iraq
Cincinnati Post - OH,USA
The Defense Department has no clue about what happened to at least 190000 guns - 110000 AK47s and 80000 pistols - that it gave Iraqi security forces in 2004 ...
See all stories on this topic

Iraq Says LUKoil Will Get a Fair Shake
The Moscow Times - Russia"Any rules are better than no rules at all." Analysts said it was not clear, however, to what extent the Iraqi government would welcome investment from ...
See all stories on this topic

Maliki arrives in Iran as US bombs Sadr City
Daily Star - Lebanon - Beirut,LebanonMaliki's visit comes two days after Iraqi, Iranian and US officials held the first meeting of a committee aimed at improving cooperation on stabilizing Iraq ...
See all stories on this topic

Debate on Iraq surge's effectiveness heats up
Christian Science Monitor - Boston,MA,USA
For now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force ...
See all stories on this topic

Labels: Iran, Iraq, Iraq Surge Effectiveness, LUKoil, Maliki, Sadr City, Security, Surge Making Life Better

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 11:03 PM

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/07/07

Cav Soldiers Receive Valor Awards for Courage Under ..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11674

"Puppets Help U.S. Troops Reach Out to Children in Ba..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11682

Labels: Cav Soldiers, Children, Puppets Help, U.S. Troops, Valor Awards

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:35 PM

IRAQ News Alerts by Google - 08/07/07

190000 US-Funded Weapons Missing in Iraq
NPR - USA
First, the MST Command in Iraq did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. ...
See all stories on this topic

Does Iraq's Asian Soccer Championship Signal Hope?
FOX News - USA
Tribal leaders and local politicians called for a unified, terror-free Iraq. Iraqi musicians from all sectors of the society performed while Iraqi men and ...
See all stories on this topic

Is military justice in Iraq changing for the better?
Christian Science Monitor - Boston,MA,USA
In a series of cases involving the unlawful killing and abuse of Iraqi civilians, officers as well as enlisted soldiers and marines are being prosecuted and ...
See all stories on this topic

Duelling US and Iraqi timetables
Toronto Star - Ontario, Canada
American casualties and Iraqi deaths are both down, and Mullen declared security to be "better - not great, but better." So is the surge strategy working? ...
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Debating All Weekend Long While you vacation, the presidential ...
Slate - USA
The questions were about the influence of China, the direction of the Supreme Court and Iraq. The questions about the deficit and improving homeland ...
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The House's Last Call
Washington Post - United StatesWhile they will spend the next four weeks mostly focused on public opinion at home on the Iraq war, members left the Capitol with plenty of questions that ...
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Another Nail in Maliki's Coffin, as Iraq's Government Continues to ...
AlterNet - San Francisco,CA,USA
"Politicians in this country are the best at serving their personal interests, and that is what has kept al-Maliki in power," Amjad Hussein, an Iraqi ...
See all stories on this topic

Labels: 190K Weapons Missing, Debating, Dueling Time Tables (US and Iraq), Iraq's Soccer Championship, Military Justing in Iraq

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:21 PM

Monday, August 06, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/06/07

"Cadets Provide Look Into Day of Deployment"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11638

"Tribal Leaders Continue Reconciliation Efforts Acros..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11640

"Soldier Gets to Play With Hobby on and Off Clock"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11648

"Medic Remembers Comrade Who Signed Up to Save Lives,..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11656

"Tomahawks Team Up With Iraqi Doctors for Medical Mis..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11659

"Troops Discover Explosives for Third Time "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11663

"Luncheon Given to Coalition Forces by Iraqis"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11664

"3rd HBCT Medics Hold Free Health Clinic"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11667

Labels: 3rd HBCT, Cadets, Deployment, Discover Explosives, Hobby, Iraqi Doctors, Luncheon by Iraqis, Medic, Medics Hold Free Clinic, Save Lives, Tomahawks, Tribal Leaders Continue Reconciliation

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 6:18 PM

Friday, August 03, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/03/07

"Business Leaders Meet to Help Iraqi Banking System G..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11618

"Iraqi Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Progressing Q..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11619

"Tribal Leaders Continue Reconciliation Efforts Acros..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11620

"Female MPs Rock the Streets of Baqubah"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11624

Labels: Baqubah, Female MPs, IA EOD, Iraqi Banking System, Tribal Leaders

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 6:54 PM

Thursday, August 02, 2007

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 08/01 & 02/07

"Mechanics Keep Strykers Rolling in Baqubah"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11564

"Novelist Visits Baqubah for Inspiration"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11568

"IA, Stryker Leaders Assess Progress in Baqubah"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11617

Labels: Baqubah Police, IA, Mechanics, Novelist Inspiration, Progress in Baqubah, Strykers

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 7:28 PM

Good News From "Over There" by DVIDS 07/31/07

"Brits Team Up to Train Iraqi Army"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11528

"Djiboutian Workers Follow Winds of Change"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11529

"Troops Provide Dental, Medical Assistance to the Res..."
an be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11537

"Chief of Navy Reserve Force Visits NSA Bahrain"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11542

"Comedy Trio Brings Laughter to Warhorse"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11545

"1-10 FA Soldiers Learn Through Change"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11546

"Skip Prosser: a Soldier's Remembrance"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11548

"3rd HBCT Officer, NCO Married and Deployed"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11550

379th ECONS Helps Equip Desert Eagle Team"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11551

"Expectations, Reality - 2-7 Infantry Soldiers Reflec..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11552

"Soldiers Overwatch IP Checkpoint"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11554

"Tanker Troops Move North, Transfer Patrol Base to Ir..."
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11556

"Historian Highlights Heritage of 379th AEW"
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11559

"Airpower Summary for July 30 "
Can be viewed at...
http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=news/news_show.php&id=11562

Labels: 2-7 Infantry, 379th AEW, 379th ECONS, Air Power Summary, Bahrain, Brits Team Up, Djibouti, Iraqi Tankers, Navy Reserve, Warhorse

| Link | Posted by ~G @ 6:30 PM

  

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